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It has been suggested that direct reciprocity operates well within small groups of people where it
would be hard to get away with cheating one another but no research has been done yet to show
how exactly the mechanism of direct reciprocity fails to operate as the group size increases. Unlike
previous models that have neglected the role of memory, our model takes into account the memory
capacity of the agents as well as the cost of having such memory. We have shown that the optimal
memory capacity for handling the exploiters grows with the group size in a similar way as the
relative size of the neocortex grows with the group size of the primates as it was found by Robin
Dunbar. The time required for reaching the relative fitness of the defectors increases rapidly with
the group size which points to the conclusion that there is an upper group size limit over which the
mechanism of direct reciprocity is insufficient to maintain the cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the evolution of cooperation, the
tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy is a sort of a celebrity among
the strategies and constitutes one of the pillars, which
ensures that Darwin’s theory of natural selection does
not collapse under the evidence of the altruistic behavior
among non-relatives in nature [1–3]. As computer simu-
lations show, the TFT strategy wins the ultimately de-
fective strategy always-defect (ALLD) and gives rather
convincing arguments in favor of Trivers’ theory of di-
rect reciprocity (DR). This was proven within classical
framework of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) as well
as within stochastic IPD with reactive strategies [4]. The-
oretically, if the probability of the encounter is large
enough and assuming that TFT agents have a perfect
memory and enough time available, the relative fitness
value of the TFT strategy sooner or later exceeds the
relative fitness of the ALLD strategy, regardless of the
size of the population [5]. However, in nature there is no
infinite memory, nor the infinitely large group; the mem-
ory capacity is limited, which probably limits the group
size as well. There is empirical evidence which supports
that idea – a British anthropologist Robin Dunbar has
discovered that the relative size of the neocortex is cor-
related with the group size – more developed primates
live in larger packs [6]. Dunbar’s discovery reveals that
the size of the brain is adjusted to the size of the group
because the brain is not a “computer for the orientation
in the physical environment”, but primarily ”a computer
for the orientation in the social environment” [7–9]. In-
formation that brain has to deal with is about making
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social bonding, alliances, detecting free-riders etc.
In order to cope with free-riders, the individuals i.e.
cooperative agents ought to memorize 3 types of informa-
tion: “what”,“who” and “when”. For example a particu-
lar memory-2 agent might memorize defection (“what”)
performed by agent no.3 (”who”) in two previous interac-
tions (“when”). Although there are studies that examine
the role of memory in the evolution of cooperation, most
of them seem to be concerned primarily with the limita-
tions regarding the number of previous interactions which
agents can take into account [10–12]. It is often over-
looked that agents do not interact with a single partner,
but are embedded in a large social network. Despite the
apparent simplicity of the memory-one strategies (such
as TFT) which takes into account only the co-player’s
previous move, tracking the reciprocal obligations within
large group may place a computationally significant bur-
den on memory systems [13]. However, the classic com-
putational model of DR does not include the memory
limitations regarding the number of co-players nor ex-
plains the transition from direct to indirect reciprocity.
The role of gossip in the evolution of cooperation has
been seriously considered since Richard D. Alexander
suggested that individuals will tend to help those who
helped others [14]. This kind of mechanism is known
as Indirect Reciprocity (IR) and numerous models have
been proposed to explain ways in which it may oper-
ate. The most famous and probably the most influential
model of IR was designed by Martin Nowak and Karl
Sigmund in 1998. To each player they assigned a value
called an image score which could be considered as a
reputation of a player. The image score varies accord-
ing to the players kindness –it rises whenever the player
helps others, and falls whenever the player defects. They
arranged the game so that each player can take part in
many rounds, but not with the same partner twice. How-
ever, the players could discriminate other players accord-
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2ing to the information they were given about their rep-
utation [15]. Their model has shown that nature prefers
cooperators, but still there were some criticisms concern-
ing the model. The key weakness of the image scoring
is that it punishes the player who defects on a defector,
therefore it fails to distinguish justified from unjustified
defections [16]. Secondly, their model does not include
DR, since the players cannot re-meet. It was shown that
IR through image scoring becomes unstable with respect
to DR as the probability of re-meeting increases [17]. To
resolve the first issue considering the problem of justi-
fied/unjustified defection, more sophisticated strategies
were proposed- those that can take into account the past
of the co-player but also the past of the co-player’s co-
players, and so on. It was shown that discrimination
based on the concept of ”justified defection” can lead to
a stability if players have the same reputation in the eyes
of all members of their population. But if players have
different views about the reputation of others, then errors
in perception can undermine cooperation [18, 19]. Gossip
might be a way of achieving consensus and there are re-
searchers who believe that IR should be based on gossip
indeed [20–22]. Giardini and Vilone have shown that a
large quantity of gossip is necessary to support cooper-
ation in Public Goods Game, and that group structure
can reduce the effects of errors in transmission [22].
All those issues have motivated us to design a realistic
tit-for-tat agents with a limited memory capacity who
can move around and re-meet, who can gradually forget
their experience and who can exchange the experiences of
their own interactions when they meet. In Sec.II of this
paper we define the model of the ”oblivious TFT” strat-
egy (OTFT). We introduce: (1) the memory capacity (2)
the half-life of the memory decay and (3) the energy cost
of having the memory. In Sec.III we describe the simula-
tion experiments on OTFT agents with different memory
capacities. Only when convinced that the results of the
simulations fit Dunbar’s findings, we shall introduce the
GossipTFT players with ability to exchange their own
experiences (Sec.IV) and provide the evidence that the
gossip players can cope with the defectors efficiently even
in the very large groups.
II. MODEL OF THE OBLIVIOUS TFT
In this paper, we apply the well-known model, namely
the PD game to the multi-agent NetLogo modeling en-
vironment. In our model, agents move around randomly
on the surface without borders which may be considered
as the finite toroidal space. Each player is surrounded
by his own private space that can be violated by the
other individuals in which case they play one round of
the PD game. After such an encounter they turn away
from each other and move on. The probability of the en-
counter depends, of course, on the density of the agents,
while the outcome of the game depends on their strate-
gies and their history. At the beginning of the simulation
each TFT player is given a list as large as the popula-
tion with the elements which represent the surrounding
agents. The list can be considered as memory, since the
boolean value of each element depends on the previous
experience. The TFT player starts with the list filled
with default values false but if betrayed by someone, the
list is updated in a way that the value false at the po-
sition numerically assigned to that particular individual
changes into the value true. For example, if the player
experiences a betrayal from the third agent, then the his-
tory list is updated as follows:
[false, false, true, false, . . . false].
Next time, when the TFT player re-meets the agent no.3,
he plays defect as well. Therefore, the player who uses
the TFT strategy can correct his behavior towards the
defector and improve the overall score. If we run the sim-
ulation with ALLD and TFT in the same proportion of
players, the relative fitness of the ALLD players is higher
in the first stage of the simulation, however as time goes
by the relative fitness of the TFT strategy increases and
finally exceeds the relative fitness of the ALLD strategy.
The TFT players we have described so far have perfect
and infinitely large memory – their history lists to store
the information about the other players can stretch to
infinity and they never forget who is who in the pop-
ulation, which is obviously unrealistic. To make our
model more realistic we have introduced the memory ca-
pacity – a number that limits the storage of booleans
true. When the number of boolean values true reaches
the upper limit m, the player cannot change the list el-
ements any more – he is allowed to play the PD game
with another exploiter but he cannot store the informa-
tion true. In other words, if he detects m free-riders,
he will store exactly m elements true and hence the list
will be locked. However, it is meaningless and unreal-
istic to store such information for an infinite amount of
time. According to ”use it or lose it” principle, we forget
what we rarely see, and we are strengthening the mem-
ory of what we meet often. The phrase “use it or lose it”
usually refers to the relationship between exercise and
muscle mass - the muscle cells become larger after ex-
posure to physical stimulation, but many studies have
shown that similar process takes place in brain. For ex-
ample, new neurons in the adult hippocampus that are
stimulated by new and challenging learning experiences
are more likely to survive and become incorporated into
brain circuits. On the other hand most of the cells will
die in one week unless engaged in some kind of learning
experience [23]. Therefore, it is reasonable to implement
some kind of mechanism that would gradually remove
old information. We usually see forgetfulness as a flaw,
but in the combination with a limited memory, forget-
fulness may be advantageous - memory decay cleans the
list and frees the space to store some new information.
The sources of forgetting are a matter of intense debate
- researchers disagree about whether memories fade as a
function of the mere passage of time (decay theory) or as
3a function of interfering succeeding events (interference
theory) [24]. Over the years there have been sharp cri-
tiques of decay, questioning whether it plays any role at
all [25]. However, this explanation has strong intuitive
appeal, therefore we have designed the mechanism that
works similarly to radioactive decay – each element true
of the memory list has a certain likelihood of falling into
the default state false. A random number from 1 to 100
is chosen, in each time unit (which is called a tick in the
NetLogo), and if the number is less than the percent-
age of probability p the element true transforms into the
false. Thus, the rate of memory decay can be expressed
with half-life equation.
FIG. 1. The memory decay can be expressed either by the
probability of an element to transform, either by the half-life.
The third important feature of the “oblivious TFT”
(OTFT) is the cost that player is obliged to pay for the
memory. In the world of nature, having a brain is not
just an advantage, but also a burden from the energetic
perspective[26, 27]. Having a memory is costly, thus we
have assumed that the cost is proportional to the memory
capacity with the constant of proportionality k, which we
shall refer to simply as k-value. In each encounter, the
fraction of energy ∆E = k × m is subtracted from the
player’s payoff.
III. RESTRICTIONS OF DIRECT
RECIPROCITY
Having designed those three important features of the
OTFT, we have run the simulations with different k-
values and half-lives, measuring the relative fitness of the
ALLD and OTFT. Each population consisted of ALLD
and OTFT with the same proportion of agents. The
most representative results were obtained with T 1
2
= 800
ticks and k = 5 · 10−3. Using these values the simula-
tion showed an obvious difference between players using
different memory capacities. Given a fixed population
size, the OTFT players with larger memory capacity per-
formed better, but only to a certain extent because with
the increase of capacity the energy cost becomes so high
that their relative fitness cannot reach the relative fit-
ness of ALLD. The time needed to reach the relative
fitness of ALLD does not decrease linearly, rather shows
an interesting U-shape, which depends on half-life and
k-values. The stochasticity of the IPD is the result of
the random walk of the agents which influences the per-
formance, thus it is impossible to obtain the same exact
FIG. 2. The time needed to reach the relative fitness of the
ALLD strategy for different memory capacities and different
group sizes (40-140 individuals).
result. We averaged the measured times and after more
than 200 simulations conducted on different population
sizes we have obtained curves with minima which shift
the position nonlinearly and increases drastically along
the vertical axis. The minimal time needed to take over
the dominance increases asymptotically with the size of
the group. Clearly, the asymptote represents the invis-
ible border that cannot be crossed – if the group size
exceeds approx.160 individuals, it is impossible for the
cooperators to perform better, no matter how large is
their memory capacity. It must be emphasized that the
FIG. 3. The minimal time needed to reach the relative fitness
of the ALLD rises asymptotically with the group size.
probability of the encounter was conserved since we have
programmed the simulation in such way that the size of
4the world was adjusted i.e. proportional to the number
of agents.The minimal time corresponds to the optimal
memory capacity suitable for a given group size. Amaz-
ingly, the optimal capacity is correlated to the group size
with the regression coefficient r=0.9943. Such a strong
correlation undoubtedly shows that our model faithfully
represents what was suggested and empirically confirmed
in the research of primates.
FIG. 4. The optimal memory capacity for a given group size
increases linearly with the size of the population.
IV. THE GOSSIP TFT
Learning via direct encounters involves risk of being
cheated. A less dangerous and therefore more optimal
learning method is witnessing the experiences of oth-
ers. This method usually called vicarious learning has
been observed in a variety of animals from drosophila to
mice [28]. In humans, vicarious learning is transmitted
through multiple channels including imitation, conversa-
tion and gossip.
In order to cross the group size border we have designed
a special type of TFT players who can exchange the infor-
mation stored in their history lists. Unlike other authors,
we didn’t try to build the reputation, but rather to use
the instruments provided so far in the framework of DR.
Instead of using the image score, we decided to rely on
the history lists of players engaged in the encounter. The
new kind of player that we named GossipTFT is able to
alter the boolean values of its list when they get in touch
with their kind. The procedure goes as follows: If two
GossipTFT players meet both of them update their lists
according to the simple logical rule: true OR false with
the same position on the lists results in true to both of
them. The rule may be thought of as precaution which
is easy to be justified from the evolutionary perspective
–“If he had bad experience with that guy, maybe it’s
better to be cautious.” The asymmetry in consequences
between false negatives (which can result in being hurt)
and false alarms has often led the evolution in the direc-
tion of setting the fear threshold quite low (so that even
light stimuli are actually interpreted as dangerous) [29].
FIG. 5. If GossipTFT players meet both of them update their
lists according to the simple logical rule: true OR false with
the same position on the lists results in true to both of them.
The GossipTFT players possess the same features, as
the OTFT players; limited memory which decays over
time and the energy cost of having the memory. Clearly,
the cost of having the ability to gossip and to remember
must be higher than the ability just to remember. That
is why we decided to use k-values k > 5 · 10−3 When
pushed into the arena to fight versus the ALLD players,
the GossipTFT players show an amazing performance.
To make it harder for the GossipTFT, we have chosen a
k-value k = 8 · 10−3, but even then their speed is almost
incomparable; in the small groups they can reach the
relative fitness of the ALLD strategy four times faster
than the OTFT strategy. In the large groups they can
make it forty times faster.
FIG. 6. The performance of the OTFT players (with k = 5 ·
10−3) compared to the GossipTFT players (with k = 8·10−3).
5V. DISCUSSION
It has been suggested that direct reciprocity operates
well within small groups of people where it would be
hard to get away with cheating one another [30] but
no research has been done yet to show how exactly the
mechanism of direct reciprocity fails to operate as the
group size increases. Unlike previous models that have
neglected the role of memory, our model takes into ac-
count the cognitive abilities of the individuals as well as
the cost of having those abilities. As it was shown, we
have modified the TFT strategy and introduced: (1) the
memory capacity (2) the half-life of the memory decay
and (3) the energy cost of having the memory. Using the
NetLogo simulations on such “oblivious TFT” (OTFT)
we have shown that the optimal memory capacity for
handling the exploiters grows with the group size pre-
cisely as Dunbar empirically found. Moreover, we have
shown that the time required for reaching the relative
fitness of the defectors increases asymptotically with the
population size which points to the conclusion that there
is an upper group size limit at approximately 160 indi-
viduals over which the mechanism of direct reciprocity is
insufficient to maintain the cooperation. It seems that
above the upper limit it is necessary to allow the hori-
zontal transmission of the information i.e. rumors about
the free-riders present in the population. In order to al-
low such transmission without conceptual modifications
of the starting model we have equipped our agents with
the ability to exchange their own experiences with one
another. Such agents, namely GossipTFT players, do
not operate by discriminating the individuals according
to their reputation, but rather by collecting the experi-
ences of other GossipTFT players. The knowledge col-
lected from others as well as the knowledge gained from
the direct encounters may be fading since they forget
the information over time, but it seems that these cogni-
tive shortcomings do not reduce their performance. The
GossipTFT players can cope with the defectors efficiently
much faster than OTFT players even in the large groups
and even when the energy cost of gossiping is significantly
higher than the cost of just memorizing. The benefit of
the information transmission through the population ob-
viously exceeds the price paid for being able to commu-
nicate.
It is believed that the demand for social cooperation
via indirect reciprocity has propelled the evolution of hu-
man language[30] and this paper supports that belief
– the stability of a large group is possible, as we have
shown, only if there exist a communication which enables
the denouncement of the exploiters. Thanks to language,
humans are able to overcome the limitations of direct
observations and can exchange information about each
other, thus isolating defectors and selecting cooperative
partners [21]. One might argue that in a real world, gos-
sip is unreliable and cannot lead to the consensus about
the kindness of the players, but still –in larger societies,
especially in the structured societies there may be some
other mechanisms of reputation besides the image score.
The image of an individual may be determined by the
performance of its subgroup as well. If such information,
namely the group score is available then the agents do
not need to have perfect knowledge about others’ agent
individual histories. On the contrary, as it was shown
recently, for large populations only a tiny proportion of
image scoring is sufficient to maintain the cooperation
[31].
However, there are many features that have not been
discussed nor included in the model, for example, the re-
production of the agents. The rise of the relative fitness
over time, results in the increase of the probability of
having the offspring, but the passage of time has relative
meaning depending on the life span and the birth rate of
the population. So far we have proven that time needed
to reach the relative fitness of the defectors goes to in-
finity while the group grows, but we will not understand
completely the transition from DR to IR, as long as we
neglect the reproduction. We can only speculate that the
critical group size might be even smaller when individu-
als reproduce since the arrival of the newborn members
demands even a larger memory capacity. The implemen-
tation of the mechanism of reproduction into the small
group brings in a whole series of problems since random
drift can strongly affect evolution, but this work remains
yet to be done.
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